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Interest-Rate Exposure and Bank Mergers
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Draft: December 19, 1996
Abstract:   This study examines how interest rates and interest-rate exposures affect the
level of acquisition activity, the identities of targets and acquirers, and the pricing of
acquisitions in the banking industry. Using a sample of 477 large mergers from 1980 to
1994, we find that the level of acquisition activity is more negatively correlated with
interest rates and more positively correlated with yield curve spreads for banks than for
non-banks. Although we find that targets and acquirers have significantly different
interest-rate exposures, we find little evidence that one group is consistently better or
worse positioned, ex post, for various interest-rate environments. Finally, we find evidence
that merger pricing is a function of the interest-rate environment, with acquirers paying
higher prices and earning lower returns when rates are lower (and when more deals are
announced.)I. Introduction
Bank executives and industry analysts would readily agree that interest-rate
exposure is important to depository institutions. Research shows that interest rate
movements affect bank earnings and value, and banks explicitly acknowledge this impact
in their asset and liability management practices. 
1 Interest rate changes can affect not
only the value of individual assets and liabilities, but also the value of firm strategies,
such as banks’ investment programs. The purpose of this study is to examine how
changes in interest rates affect one of the most significant investment decisions in the
banking industry, the decision to acquire other banks.
Acquisitions have been a major phenomena in the consolidation of the U.S.
banking industry over the last few decades and have been the defining strategy for some
banks. For example, BancOne Corporation’s explicit acquisition strategy resulted in 50
acquisitions in the decade ending in 1992, which increased the holding company’s assets
tenfold. Moreover, aggregate acquisition activity has been substantial. The total value of
proposed bank mergers as a percentage of U.S. banks’ book value of equity averaged
13% between 1981 and 1994,
2 and was three times larger than industry-wide investments
1 For example, see Schrand (1996) for a discussion of how asset and liability management policies
influence value-exposures of savings and loan associations or Esty, Tufano, and Headley (1994) for an
analysis of asset and liability management at BancOne Corporation.
2 The value of all proposed bank mergers came from Securities Data Company, and includes not only
completed deals, but also withdrawn transactions. This value represents the value of cash and securities
offered for the equity of the target, as banks typically acquire the equity of a bank in a takeover. The value
of proposed transactions is compared with the book value of equity in the banking sector as of the end of
the prior year, as reported by the Federal Reserve Bank Flow of Funds Accounts. This comparison is
inexact for a number of reasons: it compares market values (with acquisition premiums offered) with book
values prior to the acquisition run-up, and it may double acquisition activity if a withdrawn deal is
subsequently completed by another bank. The calculation merely attempts to illustrate the order of
magnitude of bank merger activity over the period.in property, plant and equipment over the period.
3 Finally, banking mergers were an
important segment of total U.S. merger activity, accounting for 7% of the total value from
1981 to 1994.
4
Because changes in interest rates are an important determinant of bank values,
cash flows, and profits, and because acquisitions represent a major investment activity for
banks, it seems natural to ask how they are related. To study this relation, we constructed
a database of large U.S. bank mergers (valued at over $50 million) that were announced
from 1980 to 1994 when 10-year interest rates ranged from 5% to nearly 15%. We use
both practitioner wisdom and academic theory to help frame hypotheses about how
interest rates might affect the market for bank acquisitions, in particular the  level  of
acquisition activity, the identities of targets and acquirers, and the pricing of deals.
Using a sample of 477 large banking mergers, we find that the level of bank
acquisition activity is more negatively correlated with interest rates and more positively
correlated with yield curve spreads for banks than for non-banks. Although we find that
targets and acquirers have
evidence that one group is
interest-rate environments.
significantly different interest-rate exposures, we find little
consistently better or worse positioned,  ex post, for various
Finally, we find evidence that merger pricing and acquirer
excess returns are a function of the interest-rate environment. This evidence suggests that
interest rates and interest-rate exposure does, indeed, affect the market for bank
acquisitions.
3 To calculate the additions to net property, plant and equipment, we obtained the aggregate value of bank
premises, furniture and fixtures, and other assets representing bank premises from FDIC reports during this
period. This information is contained in tables describing the assets and liabilities of commercial banks,
published annually in the Federal Deposit Insurance Co., Statistics on Banking (Annual issues, 1980-1994).
4 This calculation is based on data described later in this paper.
2The paper is organized in six sections. Section II motivates the paper, applying
Froot and Stein’s (1991) model of imperfect capital markets to the banking sector to
explain why interest-rate exposures could affect merger activity and pricing. Section III
shows the relation between interest rates and the level of acquisition activity. Section IV
describes the merger data used in the remainder of the study and defines how we measure
interest-rate sensitivity. Section V provides empirical evidence on the interest-rate
sensitivity of targets and acquirers, as well as the pricing of deals as a function of bank
characteristics and the interest-rate environment. Finally, Section VI concludes.
II. Interest-Rate Exposures And The Market For Acquisitions
While bank acquisitions are primarily motivated by factors such as potential cost-
savings and geographic expansion, interest-rate exposures could have some impact on the
acquisition process. A number of authors have established a link between risk exposures
and investment activities, both in theory and practice.
5 For example, Froot and Stein
(hereafter F&S, 1991) examine the impact of exchange-rate movements on foreign direct
investments. In their model, potential domestic and foreign buyers of a domestic asset
are endowed with initial wealth in different currencies. Exchange-rate shocks affect the
relative value of these endowments. Were there no capital market imperfections, changes
in the potential bidders’ initial endowments would be irrelevant, as each would be able to
finance the purchase of the asset equally well. However, Froot and Stein suggest that
5 Using empirical data, Fazarri, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) and Lamont (1996) document that fluctuations
in cash flows can affect firm investment.capital market imperfections, in particular costly external finance, prevent firms from
bidding their unconstrained reservation prices for the asset. Instead, they are forced to
make constrained bids which are a function of external financing costs. As a result,
exchange rates affect the acquisition market because of their effect on relative wealth.
Consistent with this hypothesis, Froot and Stein find that foreign direct investment
patterns in the United States are related to exchange rate movements.
The application of this model to the banking acquisition market is direct.
6 Banks
are “endowed” with certain assets and liabilities whose values are affected by interest
rates. Like the firms in F&S’s model, banks are free to adjust these exposures through
hedging activities.
7 Some banks select interest-rate exposures different from their peers
as a strategic choice, hoping to use this difference to their competitive advantage. As an
empirical matter, banks do chose different exchange rate exposures. The Appendix to
this paper describes the average interest-rate exposures of all publicly-traded banks. From
1980-94, on average, 53.4% of all banks were positioned to benefit from rate decreases
(the range is from 36% to 69%), while 46.6% were positioned to benefit from rate
increases. After the fact, some of these banks will appear to have been “lucky” while
others will appear to have been “unlucky” and their respective earnings, cash flow and
values will reflect these outcomes.
6 Froot and Stein (1996) develop a version of a costly-external finance model for banking to prescribe risk
management policies for banks.
7 While interest-rate exposure can be easily changeable, it can nevertheless have large impacts on bank
values. Banks can consciously choose certain exposures and leave them unchanged over time or they can
hedge away interest rate risk. This aspect of interest-rate risk management makes exposures in part a
policy decision of the bank with material value implications; for an example, see Esty, Tufano, and
Headley (1994).If there were no capital market imperfections, then changes in banks’ relative
endowments would not affect their acquisition decisions. However, Houston, James and
Marcus (1996) show that bank loan decisions are a function of internal cash flow and that
subsidiary bank loan growth is sensitive to holding company cash flow and capital
position, suggesting that external capital is scarce and expensive for banks. In the
extreme, regulatory constraints that prevent non-banks from acquiring banks make
external financing infinitely costly for certain potential bidders.
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Consistent with a F&S-like model, we seek to motivate how interest rate shocks
may affect the aggregate level of merger activity, the identities of bidders and targets, and
the pricing  of transactions. Consider three potential acquirers (banks A, B, and C).
Following F&S, we assume that a bank’s ability to acquire is a function of its internal
wealth due to capital constraints. Figure 1 shows each bank’s ability to pay for targets as
a function of interest rates. At current interest rates (r0), all three have equal wealth and,
therefore, equal ability to pay for a given target.
9 However, if rates were to rise to r1, A’s
wealth or market value would rise (we would call it an asset-sensitive bank), B’s would
be unchanged, and C’s would fall (we would call it liability-sensitive.) Initially, we
assume that there is a fixed number of potential acquirers and only one potential target.
In the rising-rate environment, bank C might be effectively closed out of the
acquisition market because its ability to pay drops relative to other banks. Alternatively,
8 In this regard, the banking industry resembles the competitive environment described by Shliefer and
Vishny (1992), in that buyers for assets are all drawn from existing competitors in the industry, who
presumably are subject to common shocks. They show that if all firms in an industry experience a common
shock (in this context, a change in interest rates), then liquidation values (in this context, acquisition prices)
could drop due to the surplus of targets and dearth of acquirers from within the industry.
9 Froot and Stein assume that the target is worth the same to all bidders, ignoring differences in valuation
that are functions of different control.were rates to drop, C would be better able to acquire targets than its rivals. Thus,  the
identity of acquirers is likely to be a function of their interest rate exposures and recent
changes in rates.
Were the population of potential bidders to be unequally distributed among the
three types of exposures, then the quantity of deals could also be a function of changes in
the interest rate environment. For example, suppose that 1% of all potential acquirers
shared C’s exposure, 24% had B’s exposure, and only 75% shared A’s exposure. In
rising rate environments, there would be many potential acquirers which might, in turn,
increase the level of merger activity; alternatively, in falling rate environments, only a
handful of potential acquirers could mount successful bids.
10 Practitioners have noted
that low interest rates tend to accelerate bank merger activity, through their impact on
bank stock prices.
11 We test this proposition by examining the relation between interest
rates and the number and dollar value of bank mergers.
Instead of the quantity of deals changing in response to rates, the pricing of deals
could also change. One might expect that the pricing of deals would become “rich” when
many potential bidders are chasing a limited number of targets. Practitioners have
suggested that interest-rate induced rises in stock prices could lead acquirers to pay
higher prices for targets, suggesting a link between interest rates and acquisition prices.
One analyst remarked, “Falling rates bolster the stock prices of many big banks. This, in
turn, permits acquisition-minded banks to pay a higher premium for assets” (Breskin,
10 Were there no capital constraints, these handful of bidders could buy an infinite number of banks.
However, with costly external financing, they would be limited.
11 For an example, see Arnold G. Danielson, “Banking in the Northeast States: What to Expect in Future
Consolidation?” Banking Policy Report 14 (April 3, 1995); or Joseph Radigan, “Getting Out While the1995). In this study, we examine deal pricing or quality by examining bidders’ and
targets’ cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) at announcement, as well as other measures
of acquisition premia.
Of course, changes in interest rates are likely to affect bank targets as well as
acquirers. Interest-rate shocks that reduce the value of a target (and hence the amount of
money a bidder would need to raise) make that firm easier to acquire in the F&S model,
holding constant the distribution of acquirer ability-to-pay. Thus, the identity of targets
might also be affected by the interest-rate environment and target exposures. This
prediction is consistent with prior research has shown that acquisition targets are often
relatively weak firms with poor recent performance. 
12 We expect targets to be “unlucky”
or poorly-positioned banks whose earnings and cash flows have been weakened due to
interest-rate movements.
This discussion is intended to motivate why interest rates and their exposures
might affect the level of acquisition activity, the identities of targets and acquirers and the
pricing of deals. The precise implications of models like F&S are driven by the
distribution of interest-rate exposures of potential acquirers and targets at any given point
in time, and cannot be generally inferred. The purpose of the empirical analysis is not to
test a particular model so much as to provide empirical evidence that sheds light on the
link between interest rates and the workings of the acquisition market.
Getting’s Good,” U.S. Banker (March 1995): “But given the toll rising interest rates have taken, the year
that is now nearly three months old may mark the passage of a remarkably busy period of consolidation.”
12 See Asquith (1983) for early evidence that targets experience a run-down in their stock returns prior to
the announcement of the merger.III. Interest Rates and the Level of Merger Activity
Publications that track merger and acquisition activity, such as  Mergerstat
Review,  often rank the banking industry as the most active industry in terms of the
number and value of mergers.
13 On average, bank mergers represent 7.3% of total
mergers by number and 6.9% by value, rising in some years to be as much as 16% of the
total value.
14 Annual levels of bank and non-bank merger activity are positively, but
imperfectly, correlated with one another, with correlations of 63% and 16% for the value
and number of deals, respectively. The positive correlations suggest that common factors
affect both bank and non-bank merger activity. For example, aggregate merger activity
tends to coincide with rising stock markets,
15 and practitioners have long suspected that
bank mergers do as well.
16 The imperfect  correlation between bank and non-bank
mergers suggest that other factors may affect them differently. In particular, bank values
and bank mergers may be more closely linked to interest rates, as interest rates may have
a more direct and material impact on banks than non-banks.
To determine whether bank and non-bank mergers respond differently to stock
market and interest-rate factors, we correlate annual measures of merger activity with
13 For example, see Mergerstat Review from 1985 to 1995.
14 Compiled from Securities Data Corp. merger and acquisition database, for the years 1981 to 1994.
These figures represent the number and consideration value for completed merger transactions, including
both full and partial acquisitions.
15 For evidence spanning different time periods, see Melicher, Lodolter, and D’Antonio (1983), Nelson
(1959), Warshawsky (1987), Shleifer and Vishny (1990), and Golbe and White (1988).
16 “For the big banks, lofty stock prices translate into strong currency for acquisitions. That is one reason
many analysts expect merger activity to increase in 1997.” (Stephen E. Frank, “Time is Right to Take
Stock of Little Banks,” Wall Street Journal, November 18, 1996, p. C 1.)
8stock market indices and interest rates over the period from 1981 to 1994. Specifically,
we use two stock market indices (the S&P 500 Index and the S&P Money Center Bank
Index) and two interest-rate measures (the yields on 1-year Treasury bills and 10-year
Treasury bonds.) In addition, we correlate merger activity with the spread between one-
year and ten-year Treasury yields. Table 1 presents these correlations. Because we focus
on large bank mergers later in the paper, defined as mergers where the total consideration
offered is greater than $50 million, we show correlations for all bank mergers and for
large bank mergers. This analysis shows that correlations for total bank and large bank
merger activity are similar, particularly in terms of value.
Consistent with previous work, both bank and non-bank merger activity are
positively correlated with broad equity indices. The correlation between bank merger
volume and the S&P 500 is 63% compared to 35% for non-banks, although only the
former is significantly different from zero at the 5% level. The correlations with the S&P
Money Center Bank Index are both significant and approximately equal. We suspect that
bank mergers may be slightly more closely linked with the equity indices because a large
fraction of bank deals use stock as the form of consideration.
A more dramatic difference exists in the correlations with interest rates. Table 1
shows that the value of bank merger activity is more negatively correlated with interest
rates than non-bank merger activity (-80% vs. -28% for the l-year Treasury bill). As
rates rise, the value of bank mergers declines more sharply than does non-bank mergers.
17
17 We suspect that the value of all bank deals is more strongly correlated with interest rates than the number
of deals because bank stock prices and interest rates tended to be inversely related in the period we studied,
as shown in the Appendix. As a result, rate increases would reduce not only the number of deals, but also
the value per bank, leading to an even stronger relationship between rates and the value of bank deals than
between rates and the number of deals.One can also see a significant difference in the correlations with the yield curve spread.
For non-banks, the correlation between the value of deals and the yield spread is negative
16% compared to positive 83% for banks. In other words, as the yield curve steepens, the
value of bank mergers increases while the value of non-bank mergers declines.
These results confirm conventional wisdom that bank merger activity (the
quantity of deals) is more closely related to interest rates and yield curve spreads than is
non-bank merger activity. Of course, with a relatively short time-series, it is difficult to
ascertain whether these correlations mistakenly capture the effects of other factors such as
changes in regulation. Instead, this evidence provides some support for conventional
wisdom and is suggestive of a relation between merger activity and interest-rates.
IV. Description
A. Sample selection and description
of the Sample
Our merger data comes from the Securities Data Company (SDC) on-line M&A
Database. Our sample includes all announced mergers and acquisitions from 1980-1994
in which the target firm was a U.S. bank or bank holding company
18, and the transaction
was valued at $50 million or more.
19 We restricted ourselves to larger transactions
because they represent 80-95% of all bank transactions in terms of value, exhibit similar
interest-rate and equity market correlations to the full bank sample, and represent sizable
18 We identify U.S. banks and bank holding companies by their SIC codes: 6000,6021, 6022, 6023, 6024,
6029, and 6712.
10investments for acquiring banks (see Table 1). Furthermore, smaller banks are less likely
to have publicly-traded stock which is needed to calculate interest-rate exposures. We
define the announcement date as the first time the deal is publicly announced or is
rumored by the press as being negotiated. We verified all announcement dates with the
Wall Street Journal Index and Lexis-Nexis.
We deleted 98 transactions from our initial sample of 575 transactions for one of
three reasons: the acquirers were not disclosed, the SDC data could not be verified using
alternate sources, or there were non-bank targets, such as S&L’s, involved. We then
matched target and acquirer CUSIPs (or their ultimate parents’ CUSIPs)
20 with the
NYSE, AMEX. and NASDAQ files of the Center for Research on Securities Prices
(CRSP), leaving a sample of 477 deals with CRSP matches for either the target or the
acquirer. There are 423 acquirers and 339 targets included in these 477 transactions, and
296 transactions where we could get CRSP data on both the target and acquirer. Table 2
presents the distribution, by year, of the number and value of transactions in our sample.
The lower panel shows the distribution of acquisitions along two dimensions: full
mergers vs. partial acquisitions (typically branch acquisitions or sales of subsidiaries such
as leasing companies or credit card portfolios), and ultimately completed vs. withdrawn
transactions. The majority of our deals are completed mergers.
In addition, we collected balance sheet and income statement data for target banks
including asset size, net income, non-interest (or operating) expense, shareholders’
19 The value of a transaction includes the total value of consideration paid by the acquirer (for common
stock or equivalents, preferred stock, debt options, assets, warrants and stake purchases), excluding fees
and expenses. Liabilities assumed are included in the value if they are publicly disclosed.
20 When targets’ and acquirers’ CRSP stock data are not available, we use their ultimate parents’ CRSP
stock data.
11equity, and non-performing assets. SNL Securities provided some of this information;
we collected the rest by hand from annual reports and 10-K statements. Table 3 provides
a summary of this information for targets. Targets are significantly smaller and less
profitable than acquirers. In addition, they have significantly less equity capital and
proportionally more non-performing loans. They also tend to have significantly different
interest-rate exposures, which we discuss in more detail below.
B. Methodology for measuring interest-rate sensitivity
We estimated interest-rate sensitivities using a two-factor model which prior
research has shown to be a parsimonious specification for capturing interest-rate
exposure.
21 In particular, we estimated the following two-factor regression using OLS:
where Rit is the daily holding period return for bank i stock between t-1 and t, RMt is the
daily holding period return on a value-weighted portfolio of common stocks (the value
weighted market index from the combined NYSE,
between t-1 and t, and Rit, is the daily holding period
AMEX and NASDAQ CRSP file)
return on 10-year constant maturity
Treasury bonds between t-1 and t. Like Flannery and James (1984), we proxy holding
period returns for our interest-rate index with the yield relative, defined as
–(Yt - Yt–1) / Yt–1, where  Yt is the yield to maturity. For long bonds, the yield relative is
approximately equal to the holding period return.
21 See Stone (1974), Lynge and Zumwalt (1980), Flannery and James (1984), Scott and Peterson (1986),
Unal and Kane (1988), Akella and Chen (1990), Choi, Elyasiani, and Kopecky (1992), Sweeney and
Warga (1986), and Schrand (1996).
12Our procedure for estimating interest-rate sensitivity is consistent with previous
literature. For example, because we use daily returns, we correct for non-synchronous
trading (see Scholes and Williams, 1977) by using the algorithms developed by Dimson
(1977) and Fowler and Rorke (1983). We do not correct or “whiten” our interest-rate
series for autocorrelation because Flannery and James (1984, footnote 10) and Unal and
Kane (1988, Section IIB) show that such corrections do not materially alter the estimates
of interest betas. And finally, we do not orthogonalize our series of interest and market
returns to “eliminate” potential multicollinearity because Gilberto (1985) shows that
orthogonalization can bias estimation. Moreover, both Unal and Kane (1988) and Carter
and Sinkey (1996) find that orthogonalization does not affect the results.
changes in the price (returns) of 10-year Treasury bonds and negatively  correlated with
changes in the 10-year Treasury yield. Banks with positive interest-rate betas benefit
(have positive stock returns) when bond prices rise or as interest rates fall, and are
classified as “liability-sensitive.” Conversely, banks that benefit from falling bond prices
(or rising interest-rates) are said to be “asset-sensitive.”
Appendix 1  shows that the interest-rate sensitivity of the banking sector was
neither constant over the 15 year period we study—Kane and Unal (1988) present similar
findings for the period from 1975-85—nor uniform across the banks. To control for
industry related changes in exposure over time, we define a bank’s  industry-adjusted
interest-rate sensitivity by measuring its deviation from the average bank’s sensitivity in
13the year of the merger announcement. A positive industry-adjusted interest-rate beta
implies that a bank is more liability sensitive than the average bank, and that its stock
returns would have been relatively greater for a given decline in interest rates.
22
To check the robustness of our results, we construct three additional specifications
for interest-rate exposure. First, using daily 10-year returns, we calculate a bank’s size-
adjusted  interest-rate beta, in order to control for differences in positioning that are the
attributable to firm size.
23 To adjust for size, we divide the full sample of publicly-traded
banks (described in the Appendix) into quartiles based on the market value of equity. For
each quartile, we calculate the average interest-rate beta and measure deviations from that
mean beta according to the bank’s size. A positive size-adjusted interest-rate beta implies
that a bank is more liability sensitive than the average bank in its size quartile. Second,
we calculate interest betas using 1-year instead of 10-year Treasury bond returns. Finally,
we calculate interest betas using weekly instead of daily returns to minimize the non-
synchronous trading problem. In the interest of space, we report only the results using
daily data and the 10-year returns, but comment on differences attributable to using these
other ways of measuring exposures.
22 We used CRSP, Compustat, and SNL Securities to compile a list of traded banks to calculate the
industry average interest rate sensitivity--see the Appendix.
23 The relation between bank size and interest-rate sensitivity is not strong. In fact, the correlation between
bank size (measured as the market value of equity) and interest beta is 11%, on average over our sample
period, and is not significant in most years (see the Appendix).
14V. Empirical Results
A. The interest-rate sensitivity of targets and acquirers
Many factors such as prior firm performance, growth, leverage, board structure,
and CEO characteristics affect whether a firm is a takeover target or acquirer.
24 In this
section, we seek to understand whether bank targets and acquirers also differ with respect
to their interest-rate sensitivity. We speculate that targets may be “unlucky” banks that
have been weakened, whereas acquirers may be “lucky” banks that have been
strengthened by the impact of their positioning in a particular interest-rate environment.
Although  Table 3 shows the major result of this section—that acquirers and
targets have very different interest-rate sensitivities — Table 4 examines this difference in
more detail. Table 4  reports industry-adjusted interest-rate betas for targets and
acquirers, as well as for subsamples of full mergers vs. partial acquisitions and ultimately
completed vs. withdrawn transactions. The bottom panel of the table reports the interest-
rate betas for targets and acquirers in different interest-rate environments. In general, the
order of magnitude of these exposures is roughly in line with those found by Schrand
(1996), who studies savings and loan associations.
25
Acquirers and targets differ in terms of interest-rate exposures. The mean
industry-adjusted interest-rate beta for acquirers is +.059 compared to -.013 for targets, a
difference that is statistically significant at the 1% level. Whereas acquirers are more
liability-sensitive, positioned to benefit from falling interest rates, targets are more asset-
24 An early contribution to this literature is Palepu’s (1986) work on predicting takeover targets.
25 Schrand (1996) estimated interest-rate sensitivity for 57 thrifts using a two-factor model and monthly
returns on 20-year bonds. For her sample, the mean interest rate beta is -0.04.
15sensitive, or positioned to benefit rising interest rates. In the top panel, we see that the
difference between acquirers and targets persists across various subsamples: full vs.
partial acquisitions as well as completed vs. withdrawn transactions. Because interest
rates were falling through much of the sample period, acquirers were better positioned to
benefit from falling rates than targets in a global sense. The results using unadjusted,
size-adjusted, 1-year, or weekly interest-rate betas are quite similar.
In the bottom panel, we examine the interest-rate sensitivity of full mergers only
as a function of the interest rate environment in place in the year prior to the acquisition
announcement. We divide the sample into three equal sub-samples based on the level of
the 10-year Treasury yield: high, medium, and low.
26 Similarly, we divide the sample by
the direction of change in 10-year rates: rising, stable, or falling.
27 The differences
between targets and acquirers are most pronounced in low and medium rate environments
and in stable and rising rate environments. However, one can see little difference within
the groups of targets and acquirers as a function of the level or change in rates.
Based on practitioner wisdom, we expected to see that targets would be less well
positioned than acquirers,  ex post, for realized rate movements. For example, targets
would have been positioned for falling rates in rising-rate environments (have a positive
interest-rate beta), while acquirers would have been positioned for rising rates (have a
negative interest-rate beta). We fail to observe this pattern. In fact, in periods where
26 10-year Treasury bond yields are less than 7.2% in the low environment; between 7.2% and 8.7% in the
medium environment and more than 8.7% in the high environment.
27 A merger occurs in a falling rate environment if the 10-year rate in the announcement month is more
than 50 basis points below the trailing twelve month average; a stable environment is when the current rate
is within 50 basis points of the average; and a rising environment is when the current yield is greater than
50 basis points above the average.
16rates were rising ex post, targets were somewhat luckier than acquirers in that they were
less liability-sensitive, i.e. they were better positioned to benefit from a rising rates.
28
Where differences in rate-positioning between targets and acquirers are most pronounced
(measured by significant differences), targets seem to have been better positioned ex post
than acquirers for the realized rate moves. Thus, we find no evidence that acquirers are
consistently better positioned or luckier than targets with respect to interest-rate
exposures.
Table 5 uses multiple regression analysis to analyze the relation between target
and acquirer unadjusted interest-rate betas and the level of 10-year yields, the change in
yields, the steepness of the yield curve, and bank size, as defined below:
Level = current level of 10-year Treasury Bond yields
Trend = current 10-year yield minus trailing 12-month average yield
Steepness = difference between 10-year and 1-year Treasury yields
Size = logarithm of total assets
In addition, we create a dummy variable for acquirers to test if the average exposure of
targets and acquirers differ, and three interaction terms—one for each of the interest-rate
environment variables (Level, Trend, and Steepness)—to test whether their positioning
responds differently to the interest-rate environment.
We find that the level of bank positioning, as well as the relationship between
positioning and market conditions, varies between targets and acquirers. The acquirer
fixed effect is positive and significant at the 5% level which means acquirers are more
liability-sensitive on average than targets, consistent with the univariate results in Table
28 Were there mean-reversion in rates, these positions might be justified, in that the acquirers would be set
up for reversal of rates. However, the acquirer’s more extreme liability-sensitivity would have been
unlucky, ex post, in the previously realized rising-rate environment.
174. Target and acquirer positioning is related to the interest rate environment, particularly
the level and trend in interest rates. Targets’ interest-rate betas were higher (they were
more liability-sensitive or positioned for falling rates) when 10-year yields were high and
when they had fallen in the year prior to the merger announcement. However, acquirers’
exposures were quite differently related to rates. Acquirers’ betas were lower in precisely
those times when targets tended to be high; acquirers were less liability-sensitive in high-
rate environments (the significant negative coefficient on the Acquirer/Level interaction
variable) and more liability-sensitive in rising-rate environments (the significant positive
coefficient on the Acquirer/Trend interaction variable). As before, we see that targets
seem to have been “better” positioned or luckier,  ex post, over the year prior to the
acquisition. This finding runs contrary to our hypothesis that targets would have been
weakened by mispositioning. Finally, bank positioning is not a function of bank size as
reported earlier and in the Appendix.
In conclusion, targets and acquirers differ with respect to interest-rate positioning
just as they differ with respect to size, profitability, capitalization, asset quality, and
efficiency (see  Table 3). We were concerned that the difference in positioning merely
reflected differences in the financial characteristics listed above, but apparently it does
not. As reported in  Table 5,  bank size cannot explain the difference in positioning.
(When we repeated the analysis in Table 5 using size-adjusted betas, we continued to find
significant differences between targets and acquirers.) As a further test, we ran
correlations between the industry-adjusted betas and other target financial characteristics.
The correlations were not significant, with the correlation of betas being -0.058 for
profitability (return on average assets), -0.028 for efficiency (operating expense as a
18percentage of average assets), -0.027 for capitalization (equity as a percentage of assets),
and -0.088 for asset quality (non-performing assets as a percentage of total assets). That
none of these correlations is significant suggests that the interest-rate exposure variable is
not simply capturing more fundamental differences between the two subgroups. Thus we
conclude that these differences are not easily explained nor are they consistent with a
simple story of targets being unlucky and acquirers being lucky with respect to interest-
rate bets.
B. The “pricing” of bank acquisitions
In some interest-rate environments, there might be excess demand or supply of
targets. Put in practitioner terms, there might be opportunities to “bottom fish” in some
interest-rate environments while, in other environments, pricing might become “rich”. In
our rendering of Froot and Stein’s (1991) model, pricing differences could result from
demand or supply imbalances stemming from heterogeneity in bank positioning. We test
this proposition by examining deal pricing as a function of the interest-rate environment
and of the interest-rate positioning of targets and acquirers, where pricing is measured as
abnormal announcement returns for targets and acquirers. For a subsample of banks, we
also examine pricing in terms of target multiples.
We used standard event-study methodology to compute abnormal returns over a
three-day window around the merger announcement.
29 For each bank, we estimated the
following equation:
29 See Brown and Warner (1980, 1985). Their 1985 paper shows that calculation of multi-day abnormal
returns is not materially changed by Dimson (1977) or Scholes-Williams (1977) corrections.
19where  Rit is the daily holding period return for bank  i stock between  t – 1 and t, RMt is
the daily holding period return on a value-weighted portfolio of common stocks (the
value weighted market index from the combined NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ CRSP
file) between  t – 1 and t . Our estimation period is from 270 to 21 days prior to the
announcement of the merger; our event window is the day before, the day of, and the day
after the announcement. While we report abnormal returns from a one-factor  model so
that readers can compare our results to other papers on bank mergers, we also calculated
abnormal returns using a two-factor  model. The results using the two-factor model do
not differ materially from the one-factor results we report.
Table 6 reports the CARs for the sample of targets and acquirers, as well as for
the subsamples used in Table 4. Our results replicate prior merger studies: the average
target has a large, positive abnormal return of 12.7% while the average acquirer has a
small, negative abnormal return of -1.0%; these returns are significantly different from
each other and significantly different from zero.
30 The top panel in Table 6 shows that
there are material differences between full mergers and partial acquisitions (t-statistics =
4.45 for acquirers and 2.65 for targets), but not between completed and withdrawn deals.
For this reason, we focus on full mergers for the remainder of the paper. In addition, we
30 Cornett and De (1991) find target banks in interstate mergers experience two-day abnormal returns of
8.10%; Cornett and Tehranian (1992) find target banks experience two day excess returns of 4.7% in
interstate mergers and 11.0% in intrastate mergers. There is less uniformity in results for the bidders:
Cornett and De find a positive excess return of 0.55%; Cornett and Tehranian find a negative return of
0.80% although it is lower for intrastate mergers; and James and Weir (1987a) find a positive excess return
of 1.07%. The difference between our finding and these other findings may be due to differences in time
periods or the fact we have a much larger sample and include smaller acquisitions.
20exclude four failed bank acquisitions, as James and Wier (1987b) show that these
acquisitions are significantly different from healthy bank acquisitions.
The bottom panel of  Table 6 shows the relative magnitudes of CARs across
different interest-rate environments for full mergers. Although we find consistent
differences between targets and acquirers, we do not find significant differences in the
pricing of deals across different interest-rate environments (high vs. low or rising vs.
falling). However, these univariate results may be misleading because they ignore bank-
specific and transaction-specific factors which have been shown to affect acquisition
pricing.
31 Therefore, we run cross-sectional regressions with pricing measures (excess
returns) as the dependent variables, and bank- and transaction-specific factors as the
independent variables. In particular, based on prior studies of bank merger pricing, we
include the following control variables in the analysis (see Palia (1994) for a survey of 17
studies):
Transaction characteristics:
Ž Consideration: a dummy variable which equals one if the primary consideration
offered was cash (see Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins (1983), or Cornett and
De (1991));
Ž Intrastate: a dummy variable which proxies for potential cost savings. The
variable equals one if the target and acquirer are located in the same state
(see Cornett and Tehranian (1992) on interstate mergers);
Ž Post 1985 deals: a dummy variable which equals one if the deal was announced
after the Supreme Court’s 1995 decision in the Northeast Bancorp case
which legitimized interstate mergers (see Palia (1994) and Baradwaj,
Dubofsky, and Fraser (1991));
Ž Acquisition program: a dummy variable which equals one if the acquirer has
announced at least one merger in the prior twelve months (see Schipper
and Thompson, 1983),
31 See, among others, Palia (1993, 1994), Baradwaj, Dufofsky and Fraser (1991), Cornett and De (1991),
and Beatty, Santomero and Smirlock (1987).
21Ž Pooling accounting: a dummy variable which equals one if the deal was done
using pooling accounting.
Target firm characteristics:
Ž Size: the inverse of total assets (in millions);
Ž Efficiency: the industry-adjusted ratio of non-interest expense to average assets;
Ž Capital: the industry-adjusted ratio of equity to total assets;
Ž Capital*Post 1985: an interaction variable to mark transactions occurring after
the creation of uniform capital requirements for all banks in 1985;
32
Ž Profitability: the industry-adjusted return on average assets;
Ž Asset quality: the industry-adjusted ratio of non-performing loans to total assets.
We obtained these data from the  Securities Data Company’s  M&A database, SNL
Securities, and from annual reports. To make the industry adjustments for the target firm
characteristics, we collected industry data for large banks (those banks with assets from
$100 million to $100 billion) from the FDIC Statistics on Banking (1995) and Berger,
Kashyap, and Scalise (1994).
Because we are interested in how both the interest-rate environment and bank
positioning affects merger pricing, we also include information on interest rates and bank
exposures. The interest-rate environment variables are the level of the 10-year Treasury
yields at the time of the announcement, the trend in yields (the difference between the
current 10-year Treasury yield and the trailing twelve month average yield), and the
steepness of the yield curve (the difference between the 10-year and 1-year Treasury
yields). The results in Table 7 can be thought of as a base-level set of results, helping to
32 We also included an interaction variable for the capital ratio post-1992, a date after which banks had to
comply fully with the Basel Accord and were subject to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act of 1992 (FDICIA). The impact of capitalization was not significantly different in the
post- 1992 period from the 1985-92 period and so we did not include the variable.
22answer whether the interest rate environment affects pricing after controlling for bank
specific factors.
In addition to examining target and acquirer CARs, we also look at three other
pricing measures used by practitioners—purchase price to target book value, purchase
price per share divided by trailing target earnings per share, and the price paid relative to
the target’s core deposits.
33 Because SNL securities had this information for only certain
transactions after 1986, our sample size drops to as few as 113 banks in some regressions.
Nevertheless, because the correlations among these pricing measures and the target and
acquirer CARs are quite small, we believe they capture different aspects of deal pricing
and are important to analyze.
34
After controlling for deal and bank characteristics, we find that the interest-rate
environment is systematically and consistently related to acquirer performance and some
measures of pricing. When interest rates are high, acquirers earn higher abnormal
returns. One explanation why they earn higher abnormal returns is because they are
paying lower prices: all three pricing multiples have negative coefficients, and two of
these variables (Price/Book and Premium to core deposits) are statistically significant. In
conjunction with our finding of a negative relationship between the quantity of deals and
interest rates in Table 1, it appears that there are fewer announced deals when rates are
high, and they are done at lower prices. Alternatively, when rates are low, the market
appears overheated, with more deals being consummated at relatively higher prices. This
33 The premium to core deposits is defined as the deal value less tangible book value of equity, divided by
core deposits where core deposits equal total deposits less foreign deposits and deposits over $100,000.
34 The correlation between target CARs and price/book, price/earnings, and premium/core deposits are
8.6%, - 16.8%, and 9.8%, respectively. The correlation between acquirer CARs and the same premia are -
13.0%, -13.3%, and -9.2%.
23finding is consistent with practitioner wisdom that lower rates induce acquirers to pay
more (and do worse.) Not only are the pricing differences statistically significant, they
are also economically significant: a 1% increase in the level of rates results in 5%
reduction in the price/book multiple and a 5% increase in the acquirer’s CAR.
We also find that acquirers do worse (and prices are higher) when rates have
recently risen—the coefficient on the trend variable (-0.0064) is negative and significant.
Again, two of the three pricing multiples are positive and significant indicating acquirers
pay more in rising rate environments. Finally, there is some evidence that suggests
acquirers pay less when the yield curve steepens: all three pricing multiples have
negative coefficients, but the positive coefficient on the yield curve variable is not
significant. Taken together, this evidence suggests that interest rates affect the pricing of
deals systematically.
However, somewhat tempering our enthusiasm for this story, we observe no
relationship between rates and target CARs, which is inconsistent with the argument. We
do not have a good explanation for why the interest-rate environment would affect
acquirers’ abnormal returns and deal pricing, but not target CARs. Our initial hypothesis
was that we were omitting an important variable—bank positioning. But when we
include the targets’ and acquirers’ positioning, in particular whether they were, ex post,
lucky or unlucky with respect to changes in rates, we do not find consistent results (in the
interest of space, we do not report these results in the tables). Targets’ abnormal returns
are not related to either their own positioning or their acquirer’s positioning. However,
acquirers’ abnormal returns are somewhat related to target
poorly-positioned or unlucky targets have significantly
positioning: acquirers who buy
lower abnormal returns. Yet
24when we change the positioning variable from a dummy variable (a dummy variable for
lucky/unlucky with respect to rate changes) to a continuous variable (lucky/unlucky times
the target’s industry-adjusted interest-rate beta), this result losses statistical significance.
Thus, we are left with little confidence that target or acquirer positioning affects the
pricing of transactions.
The finding that the interest-rate environment, but not bank positioning, affects
acquisition pricing probably reflects the fact that acquisition pricing is set by market-wide
forces which, in turn, determine the balance between the demand for acquisitions and the
supply of targets. In the aggregate, bank positioning seems less important to pricing than
other bank and deal factors such as the form of consideration, potential for intrastate
economies, and capitalization, and the market-wide effects interest rates have on the
relative supply and demand for banks. In particular, the notion that lower interest-rates
bring more potential buyers into the market, leading to an increase in acquisition activity
and in higher prices, seems plausible.
VI. Conclusions
In this paper, we examine the relation among interest-rates, interest-rate exposures
and an important class of investment decisions—bank acquisitions. Our analysis reveals
three results. First, as rates fall, bank mergers increase. Bank merger activity is more
negatively correlated with interest-rates and more positively correlated with yield spreads
than non-bank merger activity. This finding suggests that interest-rate exposure has an
impact on the level of bank merger activity, as it does on the market for bank shares.
25Second, we find that acquirers have been liability-sensitive than targets. Because
rates have generally fallen over the past fifteen years, it appears that the acquirers have
been better positioned, ex post, for this overall drop in rates. However, targets appear to
have been better positioned than acquirers with respect to short-run changes in rates.
Thus there is mixed evidence supporting the initial hypothesis that well-positioned or
lucky banks might be acquirers while poorly-positioned or unlucky banks might be
targets.
Finally, we find that acquirers pay lower premia in high-rate environments and, as
a result, have higher abnormal returns at announcement. Thus, deal pricing seems related
to the rate-environment. This finding, along with the documented negative relation
between interest rates and the quantity of deals, is consistent with a theory of hot
acquisition markets—similar to hot IPO markets (see Ritter, 1984). Practitioners often
assert that the number of deals and the pricing of deals increase in low-rate environments;
our empirical analysis supports this view.
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Figure 1: Schematic representation of the maximum-ability-to-pay for three potential
acquirers, as a function of the interest rate environment.Table 1
Correlations of Bank Merger Activity and Stock Market Indices, Interest Rates, and the Yield-Curve Spread
This table shows the correlations between the annual number and value of completed bank and non-bank mergers from 1981-1994 and
stock market indices, interest rates, and the yield curve spread. “Large bank mergers” are defined as those for which total
consideration paid exceeds $50 million. The number and value of transactions are as of the effective date of the merger. The stock
market indices include the S&P 500 index and the S&P Money Center Bank Index; interest rates include the one- and ten-year
Treasury rates; the yield curve spread is the difference between the ten and one-year Treasury rates. Correlations greater than 0.4 are
significant at the 10% level and are indicated by an asterisk(*).
32Table 2
Annual Number and Value of Bank Merger Transactions
This table shows the number and value of all announced transactions from the SDC
database, (a) for which the target is a commercial bank or bank holding company; (b) the
total consideration offered is greater than $50 million, and (c) we can identify CUSIPs
and stock prices on CRSP for either the target or acquirer. The top panel shows the
number and total value of mergers are as of the announcement date of the transaction.
The bottom panel shows the distribution of this sample by type of transaction: full
mergers involve the complete purchase of a bank, while partial
involve the purchase of selected branches or other operations.
transactions typically
33Table 3
Descriptive Statistics on Acquirer and Target Banks, 1980-1994
The table provides descriptive statistics for the sample of all bank mergers and acquisitions used in this paper. Interest-rate betas are
calculated as the coefficients on the interest-rate factor from a two-factor model in which bank stock returns are regressed on the
CRSP-value weighted index and the 10-year Treasury bond holding period returns. These betas are corrected for non-synchronous
trading using Dimson (1977) and Fowler and Rorke (1983). Industry-adjusted betas represent the difference between the Dimson-beta
and the mean Dimson beta for the banking industry, as described in the Appendix. The accounting measures were collected either
from SNL Securities or from bank annual reports. Although there are a total of 423 acquirers and 360 targets, we do not have
complete data for all banks and so sample sizes vary depending on the variable in question. The tests of differences represent t-tests of
the differences between the mean values for targets and acquirers.
34Table 4
Target and Acquirer Industry-Adjusted Interest-Rate Betas
The tables below show the mean target and acquirer industry-adjusted interest-rate betas,
calculated as the coefficients on the interest-rate factor from a two-factor model in which
bank stock returns are regressed on market returns and the 10-year Treasury bond holding
period returns. These betas are corrected for non-synchronous trading using Dimson
(1977) and Fowler and Rorke (1983). To create industry-adjusted betas, we take the
difference between the estimated betas and the mean industry beta for the same period, as
described in the Appendix. The top panel shows the full sample, which includes both full
and partial acquisitions, as well as completed and withdrawn transactions. The bottom
panel examines full acquisitions only. Means are tested assuming unequal variances.
35Table 5
Target and Acquirer Interest-Rate Positioning
as a Function of the Interest-Rate Environment
The table below shows the relationship between unadjusted interest-rate betas and (a) the
level of the 10-year Treasury yield in the month of the acquisition announcement, (b) the
change in the 10-year Treasury yield from the average of the prior eleven months, (c) the
steepness of the yield curve (measured by the yield differential between 10-year and 1-
year Treasuries), and (d) the log of the size of the bank. This analysis jointly considers
both targets and acquirers, with interaction terms for acquirers showing the difference
between target and acquirer positioning. T-statistics are reported in parentheses, and are
calculated using White (1980) robust standard errors, significance is noted as follows: * =
10%; **= 5%, and ***=1%.
36Table 6
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for Target and Acquirer Banks Involved in
Acquisitions, 1980-1994
The table below presents mean cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for banks that were
targets or acquirers in the period 1980-1994. CARs for (-1,+1) are calculated using the
methodology from Brown and Warner (1985). The top panel shows the full sample,
which includes both full and partial acquisitions, as well as completed and withdrawn
transactions. The bottom panel examines only full mergers whether ultimately completed
or withdrawn. Means are tested assuming unequal variances.
37Table 7
Cross-Sectional Regression of Deal Pricing as a Function of Bank Characteristics
and the Interest-Rate Environment
The table below analyzes five measures of the pricing of bank acquisitions in the period 1980-1994. The
first two measures are cumulative excess returns to the target and bidder over the (-1,1) period, calculated
using Brown and Warner (1985). The multiples reported as dependent variables are standard measures of
the pricing of bank acquisitions, are and were provided by SNL Securities for deals announced in 1987-
1994. The coefficient on inverse of bank size has been scaled by dividing by 1,000,000. T-statistics are
calculated using White (1980) consistent standard errors, and significance is noted: * = 10% and **=1%.
38Appendix:
Bank Interest-Rate Sensitivity Over the Interest-rate Cycle
To examine the evolution of interest sensitivities over the 1980-1994 period, we
collected a sample of all traded banks by putting together a comprehensive list of bank
CUSIPs from the SDC database, COMPUSTAT (screened using bank SIC codes), and
the SNL Quarterly Bank Digest (latest CUSIP list obtained directly from SNL). For each
of these banks, we calculated interest-rate sensitivities over each calendar year using the
methodology described in Section IV. The industry sample grows in size from 295 (in
1980) to 489 banks (in 1994) over the sample period.
In each year, we calculate each banks’ interest-rate sensitivity as the coefficient
from a two-factor model of returns, using the Dimson (1979) and Fowler and Rorke
(1983) and then calculate the mean and median for the entire sample. The figure below
plots the mean interest-rate beta for each year from 1980 to 1994, which varies
significantly over the period. (The medians are virtually indistinguishable.) Given the
time-series variability, it is important to control for industry-wide changes in exposures.
We calculated industry-adjusted sensitivities by subtracting the industry’s mean interest-
rate beta from each bank’s interest-rate beta. We also calculated mean and median
interest-rate betas for different size banks, where in each year banks were divided into
one of four quartiles as a function of the market value of their equity at year end. We use
these size-quartile data in constructing size-adjusted interest-rate betas.
The mean industry interest-rate beta is significantly correlated with the interest-
rate environment. Specifically, we find that the mean beta is positively correlated with
one and ten year yields (r = .58 and .55, respectively, with both significant at the .05
39level), and with the standard deviation of one-year rates over the year (r=.49, p-value -
.06). As rates go up and become more volatile, betas increase, i.e. banks become more
liability-sensitive, or positioned for a rate fall. There is no significant correlation with
either the steepness of the yield curve or the local trend in rates (rising, stable, or falling).
We also examined the correlation between bank’s interest rate betas and their market
value. In 13 of 15 years, the relationship was positive, and in six of these significantly so.
Overall, the correlation between bank size and exposures is .115, which is not significant
at the 10% confidence level.
Finally, in addition to the time-series variability in betas, there is also substantial
cross-sectional variation in betas in any given year. To give readers a sense of this
variation, the figure below plots the distribution of interest-rate betas for a single year
(1993).
In general, we find that the cross-sectional variation in betas increases over time,
consistent with the notion that over the fifteen years that we study, the development of
interest-rate risk management tools has given firms more latitude to set their interest-rate
exposures, and that they have tended to set them divergently.
40